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Many researchers have pointed out that Japanese workers’ eﬀort level is
high. They often cite the low nonattendance rate in Japan as evidence of
high worker eﬀort since it is diﬃcult to measure actual eﬀort levels
(Koshiro 1978, 1980; Ishida 1985).1 This paper investigates the eﬀects of
human resource management systems, such as steep tenure-wage proﬁles,
nonvested retirement allowance systems, and labor market conditions, on
the amount of vacation time taken by workers in Japan.
The fact that wages are cut proportionally in response to nonattendance
in Japan would seem to imply that nonattendance does not aﬀect pro-
ductivity. However, nonattendance has potential productivity eﬀects, as
pointed out by Koike (1981) and Weiss (1985). First, nonattendance re-
duces working hours. Second, nonattendance increases costs because
ﬁrms are forced to reallocate workers in order to cover for absent workers.
The characteristics of both the jobs and skills of workers can alter the pro-
ductivity eﬀects of nonattendance. For example, in auto assembly plants,
where the complementarity of workers on a line is very high, nonatten-
dance should have negative productivity eﬀects. If nonattendance has neg-
ative productivity eﬀects, ﬁrms should have employment systems with in-
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1. For example, Koike (1981) points out that worker morale aﬀects absenteeism.centives designed to reduce nonattendance, such as counting it in merit rat-
ings and making it a factor in dismissal decisions.
We should distinguish between good and bad vacation time. Good va-
cations are paid holidays, sick leaves, or legal or contracted vacations. Bad
vacations consist of nonattendance due to absenteeism, shirking, and ab-
sence without leave. Bad vacations have larger negative productivity eﬀects
than good vacations. However, the distinction between these two types of
vacation is relatively weak in Japan, as will be explained presently.
This paper compares the eﬀect of the costs of job loss (to workers) on the
amount of vacation time taken in ﬁrms with and without unions. The cost
of job loss is high when the tenure-wage proﬁle is steep, retirement al-
lowances are nonvested, or ﬁnding an alternative job is diﬃcult. According
to the bonding hypothesis of Lazear (1979), steep tenure-wage proﬁles and
nonvested retirement allowances increase worker eﬀort by increasing the
opportunity cost of shirking because workers are ﬁred if their shirking is
detected. The eﬃciency wage hypothesis can also explain the amount of va-
cation time taken. Both higher unemployment rates and higher wage rates
increase the costs of job loss; therefore, workers will increase their eﬀort
correspondingly.
Although no worker shirks (and thus is dismissed) in equilibrium in
these theoretical models, it is an important assumption that ﬁrms can dis-
miss workers if they do shirk. However, it is very diﬃcult to dismiss full-
time workers in unionized ﬁrms in Japan. Although Japanese ﬁrms have
long-term employment practices with high employment security, widely
known as lifetime employment, Japan does not have legislation generally
prohibiting dismissals without just cause. Restrictions on dismissals are
provided by case law.2 Since employment security is provided by case law,
workers must ﬁle suit in court in order to challenge dismissals (Araki 2002).
Although workers in unionized ﬁrms are protected by case law because
unions can support workers undergoing legal proceedings, workers in
nonunionized ﬁrms may be dismissed more easily. This is because it is diﬃ-
cult for a worker to ﬁle suit in court without union support due to high le-
gal costs.3
Under this legal system, the eﬀectiveness of internal and external threats
in reducing vacation time is aﬀected by the presence or absence of a union.
Internal threats include the costs of job loss due to a wage system with a
steep tenure-wage proﬁle and a nonvested retirement allowance system.
External threats include the diﬃculty of ﬁnding alternative jobs due to high
wages at the current job and high unemployment. Because unions reduce
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2. The costs of illegal dismissals for ﬁrms are very high. If the employer’s exercise of the
right to dismiss is judged to be abusive and invalid, the employer is obligated not only to give
the employee back pay covering the period of dismissal, but also to reinstate him or her.
3. There is no low-cost individual dispute settlement system speciﬁcally provided for work-
ers, as is available in European countries.the potency of internal and external threats of job loss (by making it more
diﬃcult for employers to dismiss workers), vacation time taken by employ-
ees should be less responsive to such threats in unionized ﬁrms than in
nonunionized ﬁrms.
We should take into account Japanese employment practices when we
analyze the determinants of vacation time. First, the Labor Standards
Lawin Japan stipulates a minimum length of paid vacation apart from any
union contract. Second, Japanese workers often use granted annual paid
leave retroactively. As Dore (1973, 187–88) writes:
It is almost universally the practice to ask that days taken oﬀfor sickness
should be counted as part of one’s annual holiday. (That way one gets a
perfect attendance record which automatically gets one some way to-
wards a good merit rating.) The next, more or less legitimate, claim on
holidays is for attending weddings and funerals. Those who do not use
up their ten, ﬁfteen or twenty day’s holiday in these ways, may take other
days oﬀ with the foreman’s agreement, though it may be a rather unwill-
ing ex post facto agreement.
Moreover, until recently, many Japanese ﬁrms accorded disadvanta-
geous treatment to workers who had taken paid annual leave. As Sugeno
(1992, 269) writes: “There are still a signiﬁcant number of enterprises in
which the taking of annual leave would have a negative eﬀect on various al-
lowances (e.g., a perfect-attendance allowance), bonuses and wage raises.”4
These employment practices may partly explain the low level of vacation
taken in Japan. Thus, in this paper, I examine both pure vacation time and
a broader deﬁnition of vacation time, including used annual paid leave.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 13.2 brieﬂy surveys the liter-
ature on the economic analysis of vacation; section 13.3 discusses the data;
section 13.4 presents the models; section 13.5 discusses the estimation re-
sults; and section 13.6 concludes.
13.2 Vacation Determinants: Theory and Evidence
13.2.1 The Contracted Working Hours Model 
and the Worker Discipline Model
There are two main economic explanations for vacation. First, workers
use vacation to minimize discrepancies between contracted working hours
and optimal working hours, which maximizes utility at a given wage rate.
Second, workers use vacation time to shirk under imperfect monitoring
(Brown and Sessions 1996; Barmby, Sessions, and Treble 1994).
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4. The 1988 law revising the Labor Standards Law provided that “an employer must not re-
duce the wages or otherwise accord disadvantageous treatment to a worker for having taken
paid annual leave” (Supp. Provns, Art. 134).In order to reduce vacation time taken due to shirking under imperfect
monitoring, ﬁrms can increase the costs of job loss by paying an eﬃciency
wage (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and providing a bonding system, such
as a nonvested retirement allowance or a steep tenure-wage trajectory
(Lazear 1979). An important assumption in the models of Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) and Lazear (1979) is that shirking workers who are detected
by a ﬁrm will be dismissed. Thus, I call these two models worker discipline
models.
Eﬃciency wages or bonding mechanisms will not work unless the dis-
missal probability is higher for workers who take more vacation. Ferguson
and Filer (1986) ﬁnd empirical evidence consistent with these theories in
U.S. data. In Japan, the retirement allowance system may work to reduce
vacation time. According to the Survey on Honor and Disciplinary Action
by  the Institute for Labor Administration (Romu Gyosei Kenkyusho
1997), workers who are absent more than two weeks without leave are dis-
missed in disgrace in most Japanese ﬁrms; 91 percent of ﬁrms do not pay
any allowance on principle in disciplinary dismissals.
The eﬃciency wage model also suggests that the business cycle should
aﬀect vacation. According to the eﬃciency wage model, vacation should
change procyclically (Leigh 1985; Kaivanto 1997) since the cost of job loss
is lower in periods of low unemployment.5
Thus, the basic hypothesis of vacation determination models based on
the worker discipline theory is represented by the following vacation time
function:
(1) Vac   f(cjl, X), f cjl   0,
where Vac is vacation time, cjl is cost of job loss that is aﬀected by the steep-
ness of the tenure-wage proﬁle and the size of the retirement allowance in
the bonding model and the active ratio of job openings to applicants in the
eﬃciency wage model,6 and X represents other factors aﬀecting vacation
time.
13.2.2 Unions and Vacation
The eﬀect of unions on vacation time is theoretically ambiguous. Both
union voice and union wage eﬀects should decrease vacation time. If
unions can improve working conditions, they may reduce vacation time by
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5. This model is often called the worker discipline model. Another explanation for pro-
cyclical changes in vacation time is given by the selection bias model. This model posits that,
in recessions, workers with high vacation levels are dismissed so that average vacation time
decreases.
6. Since unemployment rate by prefecture is not available for the survey years, I use the ac-
tive ratio of job openings to applicants, which is often used as a measure of the tightness of
the labor market in Japan.increasing workers’ satisfaction. If unions can increase wages, the discrep-
ancy between contracted working hours and optimal working hours will be
reduced.7
On the other hand, since unions may reduce the potency of internal and
external threats of job loss (by making it more diﬃcult for employers to
dismiss workers) as Green and MacIntosh (1998) showed, vacation time
should be less responsive to such threats in unionized ﬁrms than in
nonunionized ﬁrms. Since employment security is provided by case law,
workers need to ﬁle suit in court in order to be protected against dismissal.
Although workers in unionized ﬁrms are protected by case law, workers in
nonunionized ﬁrms may be dismissed easily because of high legal costs in













 union ﬁrms   0.
Moreover, because of high ﬁring costs, managers in unionized ﬁrms may
increase monitoring costs instead of paying eﬃciency wages or creating a
bonding system. Workers in unionized ﬁrms may accept high levels of
monitoring through performance evaluation in exchange for high job se-
curity.8 Another possibility is that unionized ﬁrms try to screen for work-
ers with a low tendency toward taking vacation since it is more diﬃcult to
dismiss union workers.
13.3 Data
I use ﬁrm-level microdata from the 1985 and 1993 General Survey on
Working Hours and Conditions (GSWHC) conducted by the Ministry of
Labor in Japan. Firms with more than thirty employees are surveyed about
various issues concerning working conditions every year. I selected the
1985 and 1993 surveys because these two surveys asked ﬁrms about both
retirement allowance systems and vacation.
There were 4,910 ﬁrms included in the 1985 survey, and 4,951 ﬁrms in the
1993 survey. When I restrict the sample to records without missing values
for the retirement allowance question, 3,117 records remain. I use this
smaller sample to estimate my models.
To measure vacation, I use average days of vacation for full-time work-
ers in each ﬁrm. I use two deﬁnitions of vacation: bad vacation only and to-
tal vacation. Bad vacation only is deﬁned as worker absence except for an-
nual holidays, paid vacation, and special vacation, such as sick leave. Total
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7. Here, I assume that the substitution eﬀect is larger than the income eﬀect.
8. The merit pay system is applied to blue-collar workers as well as to white-collar workers
in Japan (Fujimura 1989).vacation is the sum of bad vacation only and days of used annual paid leave
(good vacation). Annual paid leave is deﬁned as the amount legally stipu-
lated by article 39 of Japan’s Labor Standards Law.
The supplementary provision of article 134 in the 1987 revision of
Japan’s Labor Standards Law states that the “employer must not reduce
the wages or otherwise accord disadvantageous treatment to a worker for
having taken paid annual leave.” However, “there is a case which holds that
the treatment of consumed annual-leave days as absences for bonus pur-
poses does not violate public policy and good morals because of the extent
of disadvantageous treatment” (Sugeno 1992, 281).
Most Japanese workers do not use all of their annual paid leave. The av-
erage utilization ratio of annual paid leave is about 50 percent according to
the 1993 GSWHC. According to the 1997 Japan Institute of Labor survey
on sick leave (JIL 1998), 77.5 percent of workers reported that they did not
use all of their annual paid leave because they had made provisions for
sickness and injury. The 1997 JIL survey also shows that Japanese workers
tend to use annual paid leave rather than sick leave for short-term illness.
Tables 13.1and 13.2show mean bad vacation and total vacation time by
ﬁrm size, calculated from the full sample of 9,989 ﬁrms. The bad vacation
rate was 1.5 percent in 1985 and 0.96 percent in 1993.9 The bad vacation
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Table 13.1 Bad Vacation Rate and Days, by Firm Size
1985 1993 Total Union Nonunion Total
Firm Size (N = 4,910) (N = 4,951) (N = 9,861) (N = 4,614) (N = 5,247) (N = 9,861)
Bad Vacation Rate (%)
5000+ 0.472 0.426 0.447 0.452 0.365 0.447
1,000–4,999 0.509 0.518 0.514 0.482 0.651 0.514
300–999 0.806 0.499 0.635 0.646 0.620 0.635
100–299 1.240 0.862 1.034 0.907 1.110 1.034
30–99 1.694 1.055 1.354 1.039 1.406 1.354
Total 1.518 0.963 1.220 0.888 1.322 1.220
Bad Vacation Days
5000+ 1.234 1.069 1.145 1.158 0.937 1.145
1,000–4,999 1.366 1.351 1.357 1.250 1.806 1.357
300–999 2.240 1.289 1.710 1.721 1.695 1.710
100–299 3.547 2.317 2.878 2.496 3.105 2.878
30–99 4.942 2.884 3.848 2.914 4.002 3.848
Total 4.406 2.618 3.446 2.453 3.751 3.446
Source: Author’s calculation from the 1985 and 1993 GSWHC.
9. A possible institutional reason for the fact that the bad vacation rate was lower in 1993
than in 1985 is the revision of the Japanese Labor Standards Law. The 1987 revision increased
the starting number of annual paid leave days from six to ten. It supplemented this increase
with a provision that conﬁrmed that disadvantageous treatment of workers who take annual
leave violates the principle guaranteeing such leaves.rate is lower in larger ﬁrms than in smaller ﬁrms. Average days of bad va-
cation are 3.4 days for the full sample and about 1 day for a sample of large
ﬁrms only. This may be explained by evidence that the sick leave system is
more prevalent in larger ﬁrms in Japan, as found in the 1997 JIL survey and
the 1997 GSWHC. In the United States and the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, absence rates are higher in larger ﬁrms (Winkler 1980; Allen
1981; Allen 1982; and Wilson and Peel 1991).
On average, the bad vacation rate is lower in union ﬁrms than in
nonunion ﬁrms. However, for ﬁrms with more than 300 employees, both
bad and total vacation rates are higher in union ﬁrms than in nonunion
ﬁrms.
13.4 Estimation Model and Descriptive Statistics
13.4.1 Estimation Model
I test the worker discipline hypotheses by specifying linear functions for
vacation taken in ﬁrm i, Vaci, by union status:
(3) VacUi    URetUi    UFwageUi    UJOAUi    UXUi
(4) VacNi    NRetNi    NFwageNi    NJOANi    NXNi,
where U and N represent unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms, respectively.
Ret, Fwage, and JOA are proxies for the costs of job loss to workers. RetXi
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Table 13.2 Total Vacation Rate and Days, by Firm Size
1985 1993 Total Union Nonunion Total
Firm Size (N = 4,910) (N = 4,924) (N = 9,834) (N = 4,608) (N = 5,226) (N = 9,834)
Total Vacation Rate (%)
5000+ 4.072 5.059 4.598 4.632 4.013 4.598
1,000–4,999 3.721 3.950 3.852 3.990 3.268 3.852
300–999 3.298 3.612 3.472 3.834 2.967 3.472
100–299 3.442 3.618 3.537 3.924 3.308 3.537
30–99 3.592 3.464 3.524 3.965 3.451 3.524
Total 3.545 3.523 3.533 3.941 3.408 3.533
Total Vacation Days
5000+ 10.563 12.519 11.606 11.689 10.173 11.606
1,000–4,999 9.839 9.906 9.877 10.192 8.542 9.877
300–999 8.965 9.158 9.072 9.992 7.794 9.072
100–299 9.648 9.444 9.535 10.468 8.980 9.535
30–99 10.355 9.297 9.794 10.847 9.619 9.794
Total 10.109 9.342 9.699 10.552 9.436 9.699
Source: Author’s calculation from the 1985 and 1993 GSWHC.
Note: Total vacation is the sum of bad vacation and the used annual paid leave.is the ratio of retirement allowance to wage at the mandatory retirement
age. Fwage is the wage at the mandatory retirement age. JOA is the ratio of
active job openings to applicants in the prefecture where the ﬁrm is lo-
cated. X is a vector of other ﬁrm characteristics. The predictions in equa-
tion (2) are then represented by the following hypotheses:
H 1.  N    U   0
H 2.  N    U   0
H 3.  N    U   0
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 state that internal and external costs of job loss mo-
tivate greater eﬀort and reduce vacation and that the eﬀects are greater in
nonunionized ﬁrms than in unionized ﬁrms because of reduced threat
credibility in the latter. A stronger version of these hypotheses is that costs
of job loss have no impact in the unionized sector because it is too diﬃcult
to dismiss workers in unionized ﬁrms in Japan.
13.4.2 Explanatory Variables
Table 13.3 lists the explanatory variables used in the estimation. The av-
erage number of days of bad vacation is deﬁned as total days of bad vacation
divided by the number of full-time workers. As explained above, I also use a
total vacation measure, which is deﬁned as the sum of bad vacation days and
used days of granted annual paid leave, since workers often use granted an-
nual paid leave retroactively when they are absent due to sickness.10
Average wage at the mandatory retirement age is a proxy for the steep-
ness of the tenure-wage proﬁle if we assume that starting wages for new
graduates are the same for all workers in Japan.11 In the survey, ﬁrms are
asked about the average monthly wages of workers who separate from the
ﬁrm in the survey year due to mandatory retirement.
I use the sum of lump-sum retirement allowance payments and the pres-
ent value of the company pension plan at the mandatory retirement age
as a measure of the size of the retirement allowance. This retirement al-
lowance is the average retirement allowance for workers who are dismissed
during the survey year due to mandatory retirement.12
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10. Of course, a high average vacation rate may mean good working conditions and may
boost worker morale and productivity.
11. This assumption is reasonable because wage diﬀerences among young workers are small
in Japan. The dispersion of earnings in 1993 was only 1.58 for workers aged twenty to twenty-
four, as compared to 3.16 for workers aged sixty to sixty-four, where dispersion is measured
as the ratio of the upper earnings limit of the 9th decile of male workers to the upper earnings
limit of the 1st decile (D9/D1). The dispersion of starting wages in 1993 was only 1.16 for uni-
versity graduates and 1.23 for high school graduates, according to the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure (Policy and Research Division, Ministry of Labor 1993).
12. There are potential problems with using information about retirement allowances in
cases of mandatory retirement. First, the retirement allowance system for retired workers may
not be the same as for current workers. In this paper, I assume workers have static expecta-Table 13.3 Sample Means
Variable Description/Units Full Sample Union Nonunion
Bad vacation rate Percent 0.972 0.821 1.177
(1.351) (0.950) (1.731)
Bad vacation days Average days absent per worker 2.658 2.233 2.826
(3.833) (2.664) (3.949)
Total vacation rate Percent 4.034 4.281 3.701
(1.945) (1.848) (2.025)
Total vacation days Number of days 10.777 11.268 10.097
(5.324) (4.961) (5.714)
Firm size Number of workers 545.670 804.403 196.936
(2416.282) (3130.041) (540.607)
Annual paid leave Number of days of entitled  14.888 16.212 13.103
annual paid leave (4.124) (3.965) (3.634)
JOA Active ratio of job openings to  0.789 0.764 0.820
applicants in ﬁrm’s prefecture (0.292) (0.283) (0.301)
Retirement  Amount of retirement allowance  1280.014 1375.786 946.874
allowance (in 1995 yen) (775.77) (772.246) (691.834)
Wage Monthly wage at retirement (in  32.224 33.819 30.075
1995 yen) (10.432) (10.592) (9.816)
Point system Dummy for point-based retire- 0.055 0.063 0.027
ment allowance system (0.228) (0.243) (0.163)
University ratio Share of university graduates  0.110 0.129 0.085
among workers subject to  (0.266) (0.273) (0.253)
mandatory retirement
High school white- Share of high school graduates  0.288 0.297 0.277
collar ratio among white-collar workers  (0.392) (0.371) (0.419)
subject to mandatory retirement
High school blue- Share of high school graduates  0.180 0.191 0.165
collar ratio among blue-collar workers  (0.344) (0.335) (0.356)
subject to mandatory retirement
Six-day workweek Six-day workweek dummy (Six- 0.130 0.0988 0.146
day workweek = 1, ﬁve-day  (0.336) (0.298) (0.353)
workweek = 0)
Union Union ﬁrm dummy (union = 1,  0.574 1.000 0.000
nonunion = 0) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000)
Log bad vacation Log of bad vacation days 0.238 0.114 0.405
(1.328) (1.319) (1.322)
Log total vacation Log of total vacation days 2.243 2.306 2.157
(0.552) (0.522) (0.580)
Log retirement  Log of retirement allowance 6.961 7.062 6.609
allowance (0.661) (0.606) (0.722)
Log wage Log of monthly wage at retire- 3.423 3.475 3.353
ment (0.316) (0.305) (0.318)
Log annual holidays Log of number of annual paid  2.654 2.752 2.522
leave days (0.333) (0.281) (0.352)
Log ﬁrm size Log of ﬁrm size 5.212 5.660 4.609
(1.245) (1.260) (0.932)
Log JOA Log of active ratio of job open- –0.310 –0.340 –0.269
ings to applicants (0.386) (0.384) (0.385)
N 3,117 2,421 696
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1985 and 1993 GSWHC.
Notes:Observations with missing values, extreme values, or both are dropped. Extreme values are deﬁned as those that
are at least 4 standard deviations away from the mean. Wages and retirement allowances are standardized to 1995 yen
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).The JOA is the active ratio of job openings to applicants in the prefec-
ture where the ﬁrm is located. To capture information about contracted
working hours, I incorporate a dummy variable for the length of the work-
week. This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has a six-day
workweek and a value of zero if the ﬁrm has a ﬁve-day workweek. Firm size
is deﬁned using the sum of full- and part-time workers. The average num-
ber of legally stipulated annual paid-leave days is calculated for full-time
workers in each ﬁrm.
If ﬁrms use a performance-evaluation system to determine wages and re-
tirement allowances, they can rely on threats of changes in these compen-
sation factors in addition to worker dismissal in order to reduce vacation.
Although the survey does not include information on performance-
evaluation systems, ﬁrms were asked about the introduction of a point-
based retirement allowance system. In such systems, the amount of the re-
tirement allowance is determined as a multiple of the monthly wage at the
time of the worker’s separation from the ﬁrm. The multiplier is a function
of the length of tenure and the reason for separation. In some ﬁrms, only
the length of tenure determines the amount of the retirement allowance.
Under the point-based system, however, the amount of the retirement al-
lowance is determined by the past performance of the worker. In this sys-
tem, a worker with a high propensity for vacation will receive a smaller re-
tirement allowance even if he or she is not dismissed in disgrace.
A worker’s education level also aﬀects his or her incentives. The steeper
tenure-wage proﬁle for more educated workers, as well as their preferences
for time oﬀ, may aﬀect vacation time taken. Since information about the
education level of current workers is not available in the data, I use the dis-
tribution of education levels for retired workers in the survey year.
In the estimation of total vacation, I include the number of legally stip-
ulated annual paid-leave vacation days as an explanatory variable, since a
worker’s tenure determines the number of legally stipulated holidays.
The expected signs of the coeﬃcients on wage at retirement and retire-
ment allowance are negative. According to the worker discipline hypothe-
sis, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient on JOA is positive. However, there
is also a possibility of a negative coeﬃcient for JOA. If ﬁrms can control
the utilization rate of annual paid leave by workers in accordance with the
business cycle, vacation time may increase in recessions when ﬁrms can
more easily adjust to it.13 In this case, vacation may be regarded as a
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tions about their future retirement allowance system. Second, the selected sample is limited
to ﬁrms with workers who quit the ﬁrm due to mandatory retirement. As a result, there is a
sample selection bias in favor of larger ﬁrms. Although the mean ﬁrm size in the full sample,
used in tables 13.1 and 13.2, is 201, that of the sample used in the estimation is 546.
13. Dore (1973) reports the actual practices of vacation in the Japanese company Hitachi:
“Foremen are reluctant to have people take leave because they have a stake in a high atten-
dance record and high production ﬁgures, and when order books are long, they are likely to
be under considerable pressure from enthusiastic managers” (188).method of labor adjustment.14 Finally, the six-day workweek dummy vari-
able is expected to have a positive eﬀect on vacation time because the num-
ber of workers needing to be absent on workdays due to sickness or errands
would be higher.
13.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 13.3 reports descriptive statistics of the sample used in the estima-
tion. The sample consists of 2,421 unionized ﬁrms and 696 nonunionized
ﬁrms. The average ﬁrm size is 804 in unionized ﬁrms and 197 in nonunion-
ized ﬁrms. The average bad vacation rate is about 1 percent, which is smaller
than the average for the full sample in table 13.1. This reﬂects the bias to-
ward large ﬁrms in the estimation sample. The average number of bad va-
cation days is 2.7. On average, bad vacation time is lower in union ﬁrms. On
the other hand, unionized ﬁrms have a higher incidence of total vacation.
The mean retirement allowance and monthly wage at retirement for the en-
tire estimation sample are 12,800,000 yen and 320,000 yen, respectively.
13.5 Estimation Results
Table 13.4reports regression results for a pooled estimation of unionized
and nonunionized ﬁrms. Tables 13.5, 13.6, and 13.7 report results from
speciﬁcations distinguishing between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms.
Table 13.5 employs bad vacation time as the left-hand-side variable, table
13.6 uses good vacation time, and table 13.7 utilizes total vacation time.15
Table 13.4 supports the worker discipline model because the wage at re-
tirement and the retirement allowance have negative eﬀects on bad and to-
tal vacation time taken. Table 13.5 reveals, however, that these eﬀects do
not diﬀer between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms.
The introduction of a point system for retirement allowances is pre-
dicted to have a negative eﬀect on vacation time as long as it entails more
precise monitoring: Table 13.5 shows that this theoretical prediction is
borne out empirically and the reduction is greater in unionized ﬁrms than
in nonunionized ﬁrms.
White-collar workers and workers with high levels of education take
fewer bad vacation days. The steeper tenure-wage proﬁle for highly edu-
cated workers and their preferences for vacation time may aﬀect this result.
The JOA has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on bad vacation time in union-
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14. Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) analyze an automobile assembly company that uses worker
utilization rates as a method of labor adjustment in addition to changes in working hours.
15. I conduct an F-test for the equality of all estimated coeﬃcients between the union and
nonunion samples. The null hypothesis of equality of the coeﬃcients is rejected. I estimated
equations for the rate of absence as well as for days absent. The results are qualitatively the
same. I also estimated equations using only ﬁrms with fewer than 1,000 employees and, again,
did not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results.ized ﬁrms and a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on bad vacation time in non-
unionized ﬁrms. The positive eﬀect of JOA on bad vacation time in
nonunionized ﬁrms is consistent with the worker discipline hypothesis.
The negative eﬀect of JOA on bad vacation time in unionized ﬁrms can be
explained as follows. Since labor adjustment costs are high in unionized
ﬁrms, such ﬁrms use bad vacation time as an additional control variable for
labor adjustment. Unions may agree to this employment practice in ex-
change for employment security.
Lastly, the ﬁve-day workweek reduces days absent in unionized ﬁrms but
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on vacation in nonunionized ﬁrms.
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Table 13.4 Estimation Result for All Firms and All Vacation Types
Bad Good Total 
Dependent Variables Vacation Vacation Vacation
Log wage –0.534*** –0.039 –0.092**
(0.100) (0.056) (0.041)
Log retirement allowance –0.253*** –0.046** –0.075***
(0.042) (0.024) (0.017)
Log JOA 0.074 0.071** –0.006
(0.059) (0.033) (0.024)
Log ﬁrm size –0.091*** 0.020* –0.052***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.008)
Log annual paid leave –0.379*** 0.235*** 0.555***
(0.071) (0.039) (0.029)
Point system –0.374*** –0.029 –0.097*
(0.125) (0.070) (0.051)
University ratio –0.278*** –0.073 –0.234***
(0.102) (0.058) (0.042)
High school white-collar ratio –0.306*** 0.068* –0.174***
(0.067) (0.038) (0.027)
High school blue-collar ratio –0.174** 0.084** –0.031
(0.070) (0.039) (0.028)
Six-day workweek 0.212*** –0.014 0.096***
(0.073) (0.041) (0.030)
1993 year dummy –0.045 0.165*** 0.083***
(0.049) (0.028) (0.020)
Union 0.128*** 0.166*** 0.154***
(0.052) (0.029) (0.021)
Constant 5.359*** 1.357*** 1.795***
(0.342) (0.192) (0.139)
N 3,117 3,083 3,117
R2 0.157 0.053 0.190
Source: GSWHC (1985, 1993).
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sampling ratios are used as weight.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.Table 13.6 shows the diﬀerences in workers’ behavior regarding good va-
cation time between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. In nonunionized
ﬁrms, steepness of wage proﬁle (wage at retirement) has negative eﬀects on
good vacation time. In nonunionized ﬁrms, this negative eﬀect of steep
wage proﬁle on good vacation time disappears. There is no diﬀerence be-
tween union and nonunion ﬁrms for the eﬀects of the amount of the re-
tirement allowance on good vacation time. The estimation results for
nonunion ﬁrms are consistent with the worker discipline hypothesis. The
results for unionized ﬁrms are also consistent with the hypothesis shown in
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Table 13.5 Estimation Results for Bad Vacation
Model 1 Model 2
Main Interaction Main Interaction
Eﬀect with Union Eﬀect with Union
Union/Nonunion Firms (Nonunion) Dummy (Nonunion) Dummy
Log wage –0.592*** 0.236 –0.486***
(0.149) (0.202) (0.100)
Log retirement allowance –0.211*** –0.074 –0.242***
(0.061) (0.085) (0.042)
Log JOA 0.382*** –0.538*** 0.381*** –0.539***
(0.091) (0.119) (0.090) (0.116)
Log ﬁrm size –0.127*** 0.046 –0.096***
(0.039) (0.046) (0.021)
Log annual paid leave –0.538*** 0.431*** –0.554*** 0.431***
(0.097) (0.144) (0.095) (0.142)
Point system 0.058 –0.518* 0.047 –0.489*
(0.248) (0.287) (0.246) (0.284)
University ratio –0.119 –0.269 –0.278***
(0.163) (0.209) (0.101)
High school white-collar ratio –0.347*** 0.082 –0.309***
(0.100) (0.135) (0.066)
High school blue-collar ratio –0.332*** 0.347** –0.325*** 0.333***
(0.102) (0.139) (0.099) (0.129)
Six-day workweek 0.038 0.570*** 0.0192 0.583***
(0.111) (0.153) (0.109) (0.146)
1993 year dummy 0.052 –0.213** 0.052 –0.169*
(0.086) (0.106) (0.083) (0.102)
Constant 5.900*** –1.728** 5.632*** –1.209***
(0.506) (0.708) (0.378) (0.386)
N 3,117 3,117
R2 0.177 0.168
Source: GSWHC (1985, 1993).
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sampling ratios are used as weight.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.equation (2). The eﬀects of ﬁrm size on good vacation time are diﬀerent be-
tween unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. In nonunionized ﬁrms, good va-
cation time increases as ﬁrm size increases. In unionized ﬁrms, ﬁrm size is
independent of good vacation time. The 1993 year dummy has a positive
eﬀect on good vacation time in unionized ﬁrms.
The estimation results for total vacation time show clear diﬀerences in
worker behavior in unionized versus nonunionized ﬁrms (table 13.7). The
absolute value of the coeﬃcient on wage at retirement in unionized ﬁrms is
about one-tenth that of nonunionized ﬁrms. The absolute value of the
coeﬃcient on retirement allowance in unionized ﬁrms is about half that of
nonunionized ﬁrms. Thus, when I use total vacation in the estimation, hy-
potheses 1 and 2 are supported. Hypothesis 3 is also supported by table
13.5, although  U is negative.
An additional diﬀerence between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms is
the coeﬃcient on entitled annual paid leave. In unionized ﬁrms, the elas-
ticity of total vacation time with respect to entitled annual paid leave is
about 0.76, whereas in nonunionized ﬁrms it is approximately 0.35 to
0.55.Unionized workers use more legally stipulated annual paid leave than
nonunionized workers.16
I decompose the eﬀects of unions on vacation time using the Oaxaca de-
composition. The diﬀerence in mean log vacation days is decomposed into
two parts: the diﬀerence due to union and nonunion diﬀerences in the
characteristics of both ﬁrms and employees, and the diﬀerence due to
diﬀerences in coeﬃcients.
(5) V  a  c  U   V  a  c  N  ∑(X  Uk   X  Nk) Nk  ∑X  Uk( Uk    Nk),
where V  a  c  i is the mean of log vacation days, X  ik is the mean of the kth ex-
planatory variable, and  ik is the estimated coeﬃcient in unionized ﬁrms
(U) or nonunionized ﬁrms (N). 
Table 13.8 shows the decomposition for bad vacations. The overall
diﬀerence in bad vacation time between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms
is –28 percent. This is mainly caused by the diﬀerence in characteristics be-
tween unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. The total mean diﬀerence eﬀect
is –43.9 percent. On average, unionized ﬁrms enjoy 43.9 percent less bad
vacation time because of higher retirement allowances, steeper tenure-
wage proﬁles, larger numbers of employees, and more days of entitled an-
nual paid leave than nonunionized ﬁrms. However, the total diﬀerence due
to coeﬃcients is positive. This is mainly caused by the diﬀerence in the co-
eﬃcients on days of entitled annual paid leave. In nonunionized ﬁrms, bad
vacation time decreases in days of entitled annual paid leave. This negative
relation is very weak in unionized ﬁrms.
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16. A possible reason for this is that de facto vacation is more likely to be counted a part of
annual holidays in union ﬁrms than in nonunion ﬁrms.Table 13.9 shows the decomposition of union and nonunion diﬀerence
in good vacation. On average, unionized ﬁrms have higher level of good
vacation by 19.3 percent. Most of the diﬀerences between union and
nonunion ﬁrms come from diﬀerences in coeﬃcients. The largest diﬀer-
ence comes from the diﬀerences of coeﬃcient of wage at the retirement. In
unionized ﬁrms, steep wage proﬁle does not reduce good vacation time.
Workers in unionized ﬁrms enjoy taking good vacation without fear of dis-
missals.
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Log wage –0.027 1.091 1.064
Log retirement allowance –0.014 –0.240 –0.255
Log JOA –0.014 0.067 0.053
Log ﬁrm size 0.151 –0.979 –0.828
Log annual paid leave 0.044 0.363 0.407
Point system –0.004 0.003 0.000
University ratio –0.011 0.025 0.015
High school white-collar ratio 0.000 0.039 0.039
High school blue-collar ratio 0.004 –0.026 –0.022
Six-day workweek 0.002 0.001 0.003
1993 year dummy 0.001 0.149 0.150
Constant 0.000 –0.434 –0.434
Total 0.134 0.059 0.193
Note: Decomposition is based on the estimation results for model 1 in table 13.6.




Log wage –0.059 0.000 –0.059
Log retirement allowance –0.109 0.000 –0.109
Log JOA –0.027 0.183 0.156
Log ﬁrm size –0.101 0.000 –0.101
Log annual paid leave –0.128 1.186 1.058
Point system 0.017 –0.031 –0.014
University ratio –0.012 0.000 –0.012
High school white-collar ratio –0.006 0.000 –0.006
High school blue-collar ratio –0.008 0.064 0.055
Six-day workweek –0.001 0.058 0.057
1993 year dummy –0.004 –0.092 –0.096
Constant 0.000 –1.209 –1.209
Total –0.439 0.158 –0.281
Note: Decomposition is based on the estimation results for model 2 in table 13.5.Table 13.10shows the decomposition for total vacations. On average, to-
tal vacation time in unionized ﬁrms is 16.2 percent greater than in
nonunionized ﬁrms. This is mainly due to the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients. In
unionized ﬁrms, an increase in entitled annual paid leave does not decrease
bad vacation time. The job security eﬀects of unions increase total vaca-
tion time in unionized ﬁrms, and the vacation-reducing eﬀects of steep
tenure-wage proﬁles and retirement allowances are weaker in unionized
ﬁrms.
13.6 Conclusion
I hypothesize that the presence or absence of a union mediates the eﬀec-
tiveness of internal and external threats in reducing vacation time taken.
Internal threats include costs of job loss due to a nonvested retirement al-
lowance system and a steep wage-tenure proﬁle. External threats are char-
acterized by the unemployment rate and potentially lower wages in jobs
outside the ﬁrm. In particular, I argue that because unions reduce the po-
tency of the internal and external threat of job loss (by making it more diﬃ-
cult for employers to dismiss workers), vacation time is less responsive to
such threats in unionized ﬁrms than in nonunionized ﬁrms. The results of
analysis of data from the 1985 and 1993 GSWHC in Japan support this hy-
pothesis.
Since case law in Japan severely restricts unionized ﬁrms from dismiss-
ing workers, the simple worker discipline model based on dismissal does
not apply. Unionized ﬁrms use more costly monitoring and merit pay sys-
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Log wage –0.017 0.448 0.432
Log retirement allowance –0.049 0.410 0.360
Log JOA –0.013 0.115 0.101
Log ﬁrm size –0.079 0.142 0.063
Log annual paid leave 0.089 1.021 1.110
Point system 0.008 –0.024 –0.017
University ratio –0.008 –0.014 –0.021
High school white-collar ratio –0.003 –0.008 –0.011
High school blue-collar ratio –0.002 0.029 0.026
Six-day workweek –0.003 0.012 0.009
1993 year dummy –0.005 –0.009 –0.015
Constant 0.000 –1.875 –1.875
Total –0.084 0.246 0.162
Note: Decomposition is based on the estimation results for model 1 in table 13.7.tems than nonunionized ﬁrms. Therefore, the eﬃciency wage explanation
of the dual market model by Bulow and Summers (1986) is not applicable
to the Japanese labor market. However, the eﬃciency wage implication is
supported in the nonunionized sector in Japan. Thus, it may be more ap-
propriate to characterize the Japanese labor market as a three-sector mar-
ket, with a unionized sector of full-time workers, a nonunionized sector of
full-time workers, and part-time workers.
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